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SUMARIO: 1. INTRODUCTION. 1.1. Potential Magnitude of TTIP. 1.2. 
U.S. Labor Law and International Labor Standards. 1.3. Past U.S. Labor Chapters 
Preserve Current U.S. Labor Law. 1.4. TTIP: Time for a new template. 2. 
CONCLUSION. 
RESUMEN: La Asociación Transatlántica para el Comercio y la Inversión 
(Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership en inglés) representa una oportunidad 
para reivindicar el liderazgo de Estados Unidos y Europa en la definición, mediante la 
adopción de los tratados de la OIT, de estándares laborales internacionales 
homogéneos y rigurosos en los acuerdos comerciales y de inversión. En el actual 
modelo comercial de EE. UU., los apartados dedicados a cuestiones laborales se 
limitan a reproducir los principios a los que hace referencia la Declaración 
Fundamental de Principios y Derechos del Trabajo de la OIT de 1998. Este hecho 
permite que EE. UU. salvaguarde sus discrepancias legales y normativas con respecto a 
los tratados de la OIT, que contienen derechos propiamente dichos. Puesto que 
muchos países europeos son consecuentes con estos derechos, limitar la ATCI a los 
términos de la Declaración podría proporcionar a EE. UU. una ventaja injusta con 
respecto a los mercados de trabajo, siempre y cuando, lógicamente, los países europeos 
no degraden los estándares laborales a los niveles existentes en EE. UU. 
ABSTRACT: The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership represents an 
opportunity to assert U.S. and EU leadership in defining uniform and unambiguous 
international labor standards in trade and investment agreements by adopting ILO 
Conventions. Under the current U.S. trade model, labor chapters are limited to the 
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principles referenced in the ILO’s 1998 Declaration of Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work. Limiting labor chapters to the Declaration permits the U.S. to 
preserve its statutory and regulatory inconsistencies with ILO Conventions, which 
express actual rights. Since many European countries are consistent with these rights, 
limiting the TTIP to the Declaration could give the U.S. unfair advantage with respect 
to labor markets, providing of course, that European countries do not lower their 
labor standards to those of the U.S. 
PALABRAS CLAVE: Estándares Internacionales del Trabajo, acuerdos de 
comercio, Acuerdos de la OIT. 
KEYWORDS: International labor standards, trade agreements, ILO 
Conventions. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) presents the United 
States and the EU with a unique opportunity to negotiate a trade agreement that 
creates a new trade model based on uniform, clear and enforceable internationally 
recognized labor standards. In order to take advantage of this opportunity, negotiators 
must be willing to embrace their leadership role in crafting a world trade agenda that 
places as much importance on fundamental human rights, as it does on reducing  
tariffs and technical barriers to trade, or protecting intellectual property rights and 
investment. In order to achieve this objective, negotiators should begin by throwing 
out old models, reflected by the U.S.–Peru Free Trade Agreement (“Peru FTA or 
template”), the current U.S. trade template. Among other things, this model is at best 
ambiguous and at worst, falls short of meeting internationally recognized labor 
standards, like those adopted by the International Labor Organization, a tri-partite 
arm of the United Nations.1 
                                                     
1 This paper only addresses labor rights and standards in the TTIP. It does not address other 
very critical provisions, including those related to enforcement, dispute resolution, investor 
to state provisions, government procurement, rules of origin, environment, investment, 
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1.1. Potential Magnitude of TTIP 
The Final Report of the High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth notes 
that “the European Union (EU) and the United States account for nearly half of world 
GDP and 30 percent of world trade.”2 In a letter to the Speaker of the U.S. House of 
representatives notifying Congress of its intention to enter into negotiations with the 
EU for the TTIP, the office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) wrote: 
“Last year the United States exported $458 billion in goods and services to the EU, 
estimated to support more than 2.2 million U.S. jobs.”3 According to the European 
Commission, a significant number of EU jobs were supported by trade to countries 
like the U.S. The European Commission states that trade supports “jobs for 31 
million Europeans.”4 In its letter, the USTR  stressed: 
The stock of U.S. and EU investment in each other’s economy totaled nearly 
$3.7 trillion in 2011, and EU affiliates in the United States employed an 
estimated 3 million Americans in 2010. The EU and the United States 
together account for nearly half of global output of goods and services and 30 
percent of global trade.”5  
Given the economic magnitude of the U.S. and EU, a TTIP labor chapter could 
have far-reaching implications for improving the lives of millions of workers If TTIP 
includes a labor chapter that actually incorporates labor standards defined by ILO 
Conventions and its jurisprudence, it would harmonize labor standards upwards 
towards meeting uniform internationally recognized standards. It would also provide a 
new template for future FTA’s. Additionally, it would eliminate ambiguities in current 
labor chapters, like those in the U.S.-Peru FTA, while at the same time provide future 
signatories with a clear understanding of what will be expected of them. 
On the other hand, if current language from U.S. trade agreements is 
maintained, the opposite will occur: instead of leading to an upward harmonization of 
labor standards between the U.S. and EU, the EU will be forced to engage in a 
downward spiral. It is not hard to predict that EU labor and employment law 
protections will erode as EU companies seek to meet U.S. competition made more 
                                                                                                                                       
consumer rights or any of the other provisions that directly or indirectly have an impact on 
workers in the U.S. and the EU. 
2 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/february/tradoc_150519.pdf 
3 https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/03202013 TTIP Notification Letter.PDF 
4 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/trade-and-jobs/ 
5 https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/03202013 TTIP Notification Letter.PDF 
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favorable by U.S. labor laws that fall short of meeting the international standards that 
most European countries have implemented.  
The difference between EU and U.S. labor laws in meeting workers fundamental 
human rights as expressed by ILO Conventions is significant. While both regions 
acknowledge and respect the principle of these rights, unlike the EU, the U.S. has 
failed to ratify most of the core ILO Conventions.6 And, according to the United 
States Council for International Business, “no ILO convention will be forwarded to 
the U.S. Senate for ratification if ratification would require any change in U.S. federal 
or state laws.”7 
1.2. U.S. Labor Law and International Labor Standards 
The basis of employment and labor law in the U.S. is that employees are “at-
will”. This means that they can be fired or terminated for any reason, good reason, bad 
reason or no reason at all, if they do not have a contract or specified duration of 
employment.8 Over time, some statutory exceptions to the rule were created, although 
employment at will remains very much a foundation of U.S. law. These exceptions 
limit, in some cases, the right of an employer to terminate the employment 
relationship.9 
One statutory exception is the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).10 The 
NLRA is the primary law governing freedom of association and collective bargaining 
                                                     
6 ILO, Ratifications for the United States,  
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11200:0::NO::P11200_COUNTR
Y_ID:102871 
7 U.S. Ratification of ILO Core Labor Standards, United States Council for International 
Business, April 2007; 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/labor_law/meetings/2011/ac201
1/105.authcheckdam.pdf 
8 See discussion,  Owen Herrnstadt, “Strengthening the collective rights of precarious 
workers under US labour and employment law”, in Meeting the challenge of precarious 
work: A workers’ agenda, International Journal of Labour Research, Vol. 15, Issue 1, 2013, 
pp. 100-102, citing Jay Fineman, “The development of the employment at will rule”, 
American Journal of Legal History, Vol. 20, pp. 118-123, 1976. 
 9  see discussion, Owen Herrnstadt, “Strengthening the collective rights of precarious 
workers under US labour and employment law”, in Meeting the challenge of precarious 
work: A workers’ agenda, International Journal of Labour Research, Vol. 15, Issue 1, 2013, 
pp. 100-102. 
10 National Labor Relations Act ( 29 U.S.C., Secs 151 et seq.). Other statutes creating 
additional exceptions include; Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. Secs. 201-219); 
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in the U.S. One of its primary objectives is to protect employees from being fired or 
otherwise discriminated against for their union activities, including engaging in 
collective bargaining. However, as Lance Compa explains, the NLRA fails to uphold 
international freedom of association standards in a number of respects.11 He provides 
the following examples12:  
 Allowing employers to mount one-sided, aggressive workplace pressure 
campaigns against workers’ organizing efforts, marked by mandatory 
“captive-audience” meetings filled with predictions of dire consequences 
if workers organize, without providing workers similar access to 
information supporting union organizing13;  
                                                                                                                                       
Occupational Safety and Health Act (29 U.S.C. Secs. 553, 651-678; OSHA—(workplace 
safety and health); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) 
11 The following summary is taken directly from Lance Compa,  A Strange Case—
Violations of Workers’ Freedom of Association in the United States by European 
Multinational Corporations, Human Rights Watch, 2010; 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/bhr0910web_0.pdf; see also, United States 
Council for International Business, U.S. Ratification of ILO Core Labor Standards, April 
2007, “Five of the ILO core conventions (87, 98, 29, 138 and 100) have been found to 
directly conflict with U.S. law and practice and would require significant and widespread 
changes to U.S. state and federal law if they were ratified. U.S. ratification of Conventions 
87 and 98 would require particularly extensive revisions of longstanding principles of U.S. 
labor law to conform to their standards.” 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/labor_law/meetings/2011/ac201
1/105.authcheckdam.pdf 
12  The following summary is taken directly from Lance Compa,  A Strange Case—
Violations of Workers’ Freedom of Association in the United States by European 
Multinational Corporations, Human Rights Watch, 2010; 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/bhr0910web_0.pdf 
13 Compa, A Strange Case, pp. 11-12; citing at fn. 22, “The only limitation on captive-
audience meetings is that they may not be held within 24 hours of an NLRB representation 
election. See Peerless Plywood Co., 107 NLRB 427 (1953) Management can require 
employees to attend these meetings, and can further require employees not to leave the 
meeting, not to ask questions, and not to espouse pro-union views, under pain of discharge 
for insubordination. See NLRB v. Prescott Industrial Products Co., 500 F.2d 6 (8th Cir. 
1974); Litton Systems, Inc., 173 NLRB 1024 (1968). Employers can also exclude 
employees known to be union supporters from captive-audience meetings. See F.W. 
Woolworth Co., 251 NLRB 1111 (1980). In 1951, the NLRB adopted an “equal 
opportunity “ doctrine by which employers who held captive-audience meetings should 
allow union representatives to present their views at the employer’s facility, noting that this 
placed no limit on what the employer could lawfully say. See Bonwit-Teller, Inc., 96 
NLRB 608 (1951). However, the Board (with new appointees) repudiated this doctrine just 
two years later, citing employers’ property rights to exclude unwanted persons from the 
Owen Herrnstadt 
 
 
 
Revista Derecho Social y Empresa nº 4, Diciembre 2015 
ISSN: 2341-135X pág. [118] 
 Allowing employers to deny workers the right to meet union 
representatives at the workplace to discuss forming a union;14 
 Denying a legal remedy to undocumented immigrant workers fired for 
trying to form a union;15 
 Enabling employers to rely on delay-ridden, ineffectual administrative 
and judicial procedures and remedies in cases of labor law violations;16 
 Allowing employers to permanently replace workers who exercise the 
right to strike over wages and working conditions (workers who strike 
over employers’ unfair labor practices may not be permanently 
replaced);17; and, 
 Mandating the NLRB to seek court injunctions when “secondary 
boycott” allegations are lodged against unions, but leaving to NLRB 
discretion—which it rarely exercises— whether to seek injunctions 
against employers’ unfair labor practices.18  
                                                                                                                                       
premises. See Livingston Shirt Co., 107 NLRB 400 (1953). The Livingston Shirt “unequal 
opportunity” rule has prevailed since then.” 
14 Id. at 12, citing at fn. 23, “Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992)”. 
15 Id., citing at fn.24, “Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002)”. 
16 Id., citing at fn. 25, “Cynthia L. Estlund, ‘The Ossification of American Labor Law,’ 102 
Columbia Law Review 1527 (2002)”. 
17 Id., citing at fn. 26, “The permanent replacement doctrine is not found in labor law 
statutes. It was created by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 
304 U.S. 333 (1938). The problem in practice is that whether a strike is an “economic 
strike” or an “unfair labor practice strike” it is subject to litigation, and it often takes years 
of administrative and judicial hearings and appeals before a final decision is reached and 
workers learn whether they are entitled to reinstatement. By then, even with a decision in 
favor of the workers, it is often the case that the strike is long broken and the workers 
scattered to other jobs. As the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association noted in 
considering the US permanent replacement doctrine, “that distinction [between economic 
strikes and unfair labor practice strikes] obfuscates the real issue ... whether United States 
labor law and jurisprudence (the so-called Mackay doctrine) are in conformity with the 
freedom of association principles.” See ILO CFA, United States, Case No. 1543, Report 
No. 278, para. 89 (1991)”. 
18 Id., citing at fn. 27, “Section 10(j) of the NLRA is the discretionary injunction clause in 
cases involving employers’ unfair labor practices. Section 10(l) is the mandatory injunction 
clause in cases involving secondary union action. For more discussion, see George 
Schatzki, “Some Observations About the Standards Applied to Labor Injunction Litigation 
Under Sections 10(j) and 10(l) of the National Labor Relations Act,” 59 Indiana Law 
Journal 565 (Fall 1983), noting “As for section 10(l), which is aimed almost entirely at 
unions, federal courts are inclined virtually to rubber-stamp National Labor Relations 
Board requests for injunctions. However, in considering applications for section 10(j) 
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Compa concludes, “the ILO has found these and other features of U.S. labor law 
in violation of international standards.”19 
These failings have a direct impact on the ability of workers to form their own 
unions and to engage in collective bargaining. One scenario, describing how workers 
can legally be prevented from forming a union in the U.S. is provided below: 
Workers begin to actively form a union. The Company responds by hiring anti-
union consultants who distribute literature about how unions only want workers dues 
money and how they can force workers to go out on strike, even if they do not want 
to. The union has no access to the company’s property and can be prevented from 
distributing literature, let alone visiting with workers on company property. In many 
cases, there is limited public property where the union can stand outside the plant 
gates to distribute literature. The company, however, can order all of the employees 
together to explain to them how they would prefer not to have a union. They can also 
distribute literature about union staff salaries and benefits which, in the U.S., are 
publically posted on the federal government’s website for all to see. 
If the company fires the union activists, charges that the company has violated 
the law can be filed with the National Labor Relations Board, a government agency. If 
a petition for an election has already been filed by the workers for the union, the 
election is either blocked or held in the wake of the discharges. If the election is held, 
it is not hard to imagine the effects on employees the illegal conduct may have. In 
areas where skilled jobs are hard to come by, threats of discharge and closings are 
taken very seriously. If the election is not held, it will take a long time for the unfair 
labor practices to be fully litigated. When the charges are finally resolved, the union 
has to start its organizing drive all over again. Either way, the employer has the upper 
hand. 
                                                                                                                                       
injunctions, which are primarily aimed at employers, the courts are inclined— especially 
when employers are the respondents—to be more critical of the Board's petition and, as a 
result, often deny or significantly qualify the requested relief.” 
19 Id., citing at fn. 28, “For ILO decisions on these topics, see ILO Committee on Freedom 
of Association, Complaint against the United States, Case No. 2524, Report No. 349 
(March 2008) (exclusion of low-level supervisors); ILO Committee on Freedom of 
Association, Complaint against the United States, Case No. 2227, Report No. 332 (2003) 
(denial of remedies to immigrant workers); ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, 
Complaint against the United States, Case No. 1543, Report No. 278 (1991) (permanent 
striker replacement); ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, Complaint against the 
United States, Case No. 1523, Report No. 284 (1992) (union representatives’ access to the 
workplace); ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, Complaint against the United 
States, Case No. 1523, Report No. 284 (1992) (secondary boycott strictures)”. 
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Even if the union wins an election and unfair labor practices are not at issue, the 
employer can bargain to impasse and unilaterally implement its last offer. If the 
workers cannot live with the unilaterally implemented contract, they can strike and 
watch permanent replacements march through their picket lines. After one year, their 
permanent replacements can vote to decertify their union while they are not even 
permitted to participate in the election.20 
As if the weakness in U.S. labor law did not already pose a high hurdle for 
workers wanting to form a union, some state and federally elected officials have made 
it clear that unions are not welcome in their states. For example, in South Carolina, 
Governor, Niki Haley, the highest official in the state, said in her annual State of the 
State address:  
I love that we are one of the least unionized states in the country. It is an 
economic development tool unlike any other…We don't have unions in South 
Carolina because we don't need unions in South Carolina…And we'll make the 
unions understand full well that they are not needed, not wanted, and not welcome in 
the State of South Carolina.21 
In Wisconsin, Gov. Scott Walker, who lead the effort to curtail public sector 
collective bargaining, compared unions to terrorist groups.22 And in Tennessee, U.S. 
Senator Bob Corker of Tennessee entered the fray in a union election at Volkswagen 
in Chattanooga saying, “I've had conversations today and based on those am assured 
that should the workers vote against the UAW, Volkswagen will announce in the 
coming weeks that it will manufacture its new mid-size SUV here in Chattanooga.’"23  
European Companies have at times only appeared too eager to adopt these anti-
union tactics, indicating their willingness to participate in the downward spiral of 
international labor standards. A few years ago, Bosch attempted to use permanent 
                                                     
20 A version of this description first appeared in Owen Herrnstadt, Time Once Again to 
Climb to the Industrial Mountain Top: A Call for Labor Law Reform, Labor Law Journal, 
Vol. 39, No. 3, March, 1988, pp. 188-189. 
21  Governor Niki Haley’s 2012 State of the State Address, 
http://www.governing.com/news/state/south-carolina-2012-state-of-the-state-address.html 
22“in an attempt to show just what a tough guy he is, really did say that his strength in 
taking on protesting union members qualified him for confronting radical Islamic terrorist 
groups, such as the Islamic State.” 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-sheet/wp/2015/02/27/yes-scott-walker-
really-did-link-terrorists-with-protesting-teachers-and-other-unionists/ 
23 U.S. senator drops bombshell during VW plant union vote 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/13/us-volkswagen-corker-
idUSBREA1C04H20140213 
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striker replacements to break a strike in Wisconsin.24  Other reports describe the 
conduct of Deutsch Telekom, Deutsch Post, Sodexco, Tesco, Kongsberg Automotive, 
and Siemens.25 
The newest European convert to anti-union methods in the U.S. may be Airbus. 
One recent story was headlined, “Like Boeing, Airbus doesn’t want unions at its new 
plant in the South.”26 Another story reported that, “Airbus already has developed a 
strategy to counter an internally expected move by labor unions to organize the A320 
final assembly line that opens later this year in Alabama.”27  
1.3. Past U.S. Labor Chapters Preserve Current U.S. Labor Law 
TTIP poses two questions with respect to a labor chapter: First, will TTIP 
provide a clear, unambiguous labor standard; second, will TTIP require the U.S. to 
improve its labor laws so that they are consistent with international labor standards?  If 
TTIP simply adopts the current U.S. model reflected by the U.S. - Peru FTA, the 
answer to these questions are straightforward: “No”. 
Under the Peru-U.S. FTA28: 
1. Each Party shall adopt and maintain in its statutes and regulations, 
and practices there under, the following rights, as stated in the ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-
Up (1998) (ILO Declaration): 
(a) freedom of association; (b) the effective recognition of the right to 
collective bargaining; (c) the elimination of all forms of compulsory or forced 
labor; (d) the effective abolition of child labor and, for purposes of this 
Agreement, a prohibition on the worst forms of child labor; and (e) the 
elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.  
                                                     
24Owen Herrnstadt, Are International Framework Agreements A Path  to Corporate Social 
Responsibility?”, U.Pa. Journal of Business and Employment Law [Vol 10:1] at p.205. 
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1296&context=jbl 
25 Lance Compa, A Strange Case—Violations of Workers’ Freedom of Association in the 
United States by European Multinational Corporations, Human Rights Watch, 2010; 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/bhr0910web_0.pdf 
26  http://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/news/2015/05/26/like-boeing-airbus-doesnt-wants-
unions-at-its-new.html 
27  https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/airbus-expects-unions-to-target-a320-fal-in-
alabama-410269/ 
28 https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-tpa/final-text 
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2. Neither Party shall waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive 
or otherwise derogate from, its statutes or regulations implementing 
paragraph 1 in a manner affecting trade or investment between the Parties, 
where the waiver or derogation would be inconsistent with a fundamental 
right set out in that paragraph. 
Two footnotes qualify the obligations that are required under Chapter 17. The 
first footnote states that the “rights” referenced are limited to violations “in a manner 
affecting trade or investment between the Parties”. The second footnote states that, 
“The obligations set out in Article 17.2, as they relate to the ILO, refer only to the 
ILO Declaration.”29 Confining the Peru agreement to the Declaration as opposed to 
the ILO core conventions and accompanying jurisprudence makes it much easier for 
countries to satisfy their obligations. After all, the Declaration is a “principles” 
document and as such enables countries like the U.S. to sign onto it without 
committing them to honor the actual rights and standards found in the Conventions.  
As a principles document, the Declaration was never intended to require a 
country to respect the actual standards reflected by ILO Conventions. The ILO Legal 
Advisor described the Declaration in the following manner:  
the Declaration requires nothing more of ILO Members than to be consistent 
and to comply with the commitment that they have already undertaken, and 
serves to encourage them in their endeavors; it certainly does not seek to 
impose further commitments on them. Contrary to what may have been said, 
there is definitely no question of subjecting Members to specific provisions of 
Conventions that they have not ratified.30 
What is the difference between a commitment to honoring principles of rights 
and honoring the actual rights and standards as laid out by ILO Conventions?  In its 
report on the U.S. - Peru FTA template, Human Rights Watch explains: “What this 
obligation means in practice and, specifically, what level of adherence to the 
fundamental ILO Conventions the ILO Declaration requires, is the subject of much 
debate and has not yet been resolved.”31 As further explained in the Report:  
                                                     
29 Id. 
30  “Consideration of a possible Declaration of principles of the International Labor 
Organization concerning fundamental rights and its appropriate follow-up mechanism”; 
ILO 86th Session, June 1988, Report VII, p. 3; 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc86/rep-vii.htm 
31 The 2007 US Trade Policy Template, Human Rights Watch, June 2007, p. 4.; 
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/usa/trade0607/trade0607web.pdf 
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…under the ILO Declaration, ILO members do not assume precisely 
the same obligations they would have if they had ratified the fundamental 
conventions. Legal scholars subsequently analyzing the ILO Declaration have 
largely reached the same conclusion. But what obligations does the ILO 
Declaration impose on members? Specifically, what are “the principles 
concerning the fundamental rights” set out in the eight fundamental ILO 
conventions and what does it mean to uphold them? There is much unhelpful 
rhetoric and little agreement on this issue.32 
Employer representatives explain that the Declaration does not place new 
obligations on parties; rather it is about the core labor standards promoting the 
principles: 
the Declaration represents a political commitment by governments to 
respect, promote and realize the Declaration’s principles…whereas ILO 
Conventions, if ratified, require governments to respect their strict legal detail, 
the Declaration is intended to focus on the steps taken by governments to 
promote the four fundamental principles…These principles inspired the 
creation of the eight core Conventions which, when ratified, transform those 
“promotional” principles into specific legal obligations. Therefore, the 
political obligations required to promote, achieve and realize the principles 
under the Constitution – and, by extension, the Declaration – must remain 
distinct from the specific legal obligations that are undertaken through the 
ratification of the core Conventions.  …the Declaration is intended to focus 
on the steps taken by governments to promote the four fundamental 
principles.33  
Given the above, the precise obligations countries are required to meet under the 
Declaration are ambiguous. Adding to this ambiguity is the U.S. - Peru FTA’s 
reference to “rights”: “Each Party shall adopt and maintain in its statutes and 
regulations, and practices there under, the following rights, as stated in the ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-Up  
                                                     
32 Id., at 5; 
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/usa/trade0607/trade0607web.pdf; citing, See, 
e.g., Philip Alston, “‘Core Labour Standards’ and the Transformation of the International 
Labour Rights Regime,” 15 European Journal of International Law 457, 2004, pp. 409-495; 
Brian A. Langille, “Core Labour Rights—The True Story (Reply to Alston),” 16 European 
Journal of International Law 409, 2005, p. 423. See, e.g., Alston, “ ‘Core Labour Standards’ 
and the Transformation of the International Labour Rights Regime,” pp. 476-483. 
33 https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/pos_2006_ilodeclaration.pdf 
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(1998)”. Does this mean that the parties are required to satisfy the rights listed in the 
Declaration.  If so, how are these rights defined?  Are they defined by ILO Standards? 
The U.S. - Peru template says that the obligations are limited to “only the 
Declaration.”34 Does this mean that the ILO Conventions cannot even be relied on to 
give these rights meaning? What about cases determined by one of the ILO’s 
Supervisory mechanisms, like the Committee on Freedom of Association (COFA)? 
The COFA reviews complaints filed against countries that may not have ratified the 
freedom of association conventions, but still must adhere to the principles of freedom 
of association because they are ILO members. (The ILO Constitution itself obligates 
them to honoring these principles.) This raises further questions since many of the 
cases reviewed by the COFA conclude that U.S. law is not consistent with the ILO’s 
principles and standards.35  As such, if the jurisprudence developed by the COFA 
could be relied on to define the obligations reflected in the Declaration, the U.S., and 
other countries, would be in violation of the FTA on the first day the agreement is 
implemented. Observers could easily conclude if that were the case, the U.S. would 
not have entered into the Peru agreement.  
Other questions remain. Without references to the Conventions or the COFA 
digest of cases, what definitions will be applied to freedom of association under the 
Peru FTA? Is it whatever each signatory understands the definition to be? Is the 
definition to be determined under Peru’s dispute resolution process? If so, does this 
mean that parties will have to wait until jurisprudence is created under the FTA over a 
long—very long—time as each case works its way through the tortuous dispute 
resolutions process? 36 
Even if a party could demonstrate that the principles or rights under the Peru 
template are violated, these violations still might not be eligible for a complaint 
because these infractions must meet additional conditions, which raise further 
questions. The Peru FTA contains requirements that labor violations must be “in a 
manner affecting trade or investment” and constitute a sustained or reoccurring action 
or inaction. The mere fact that labor obligations are included in a trade agreement 
should indicate a direct relationship to trade without placing further burden of proof 
on an agreed party.  Nonetheless, this condition furthers narrows the nature of a 
                                                     
34https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/peru/asset_upload_file73_9496.pdf 
35 See, Lance Compa, A Strange Case—Violations of Workers’ Freedom of Association in 
the United States by European Multinational Corporations, Human Rights Watch, 2010; 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/bhr0910web_0.pdf 
36  Note: The proposed Canadian-European Trade Agreement does not even contain a 
dispute resolution process for these types of matters. 
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complaint that can be submitted because only violations that impact trade or 
investment are eligible. Consequently, large groups of public sector workers, like 
teachers, are completely excluded from Peru’s labor chapter.  It is not hard to imagine 
a scenario where a complaint filed on behalf of school teachers who have been jailed or 
even murdered for exercising their right to freedom of association, is immediately 
rejected because these violations “are not in a manner affecting trade or investment.”  
Second, even if the violations do affect trade or investment, they still must be 
sustained or reoccurring. This additional hurdle raises yet more questions:  If one 
violation of the Declaration is horrific, such as the murder of a prominent trade 
unionist, would this qualify? Probably not, since it is not sustained or reoccurring. 
How about if ten trade unionists were murdered at the same time. Would that qualify? 
How many violations must occur, in order for a violation to stand under this 
requirement? 
As this paper is being written, the U.S. has just announced that it reached 
agreement with 11 other countries to form the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement 
(TPP). If TPP goes into effect, its labor chapter will presumably become the new 
template for labor agreements involving the U.S. While the agreement itself has not 
yet been made public, reports indicate that its labor chapter may be based on the U.S.-
Peru FTA text. Although the Peru FTA contains weak and ambiguous labor standards, 
the TPP will reportedly be even a step backward from that template.  
The USTR has indicated that the TPP will include other arrangements with Viet 
Nam, Malaysia, and Brunei. These are three countries where freedom of association 
and collective bargaining as provided under the ILO do not exist and where 
prohibitions against discrimination, child labor and forced labor are not effective. In 
addition, it will also include Mexico, a country where despite the labor side 
agreements of the 1993 North American Free Trade Agreement, freedom of 
association, collective bargaining, and prohibitions against discrimination and child 
labor have yet to be realized.  
1.4. TTIP: Time for a new template 
As mentioned in the introduction of this paper, TTIP offers the U.S. and EU the 
opportunity to create a new template that is clear, unambiguous and based on labor 
standards reflected in ILO Conventions and ILO jurisprudence. This can simply be 
accomplished if the labor chapter in the agreement explicitly states that parties honor 
and effectively enforce the rights and standards expressed in ILO Conventions and 
interpretations issued under the ILO’s supervisory mechanisms, like the COFA. 
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Footnotes that raise uncertainty over the definition of labor rights and standards, like 
the one in the Peru FTA limiting the terms of the chapter to the Declaration, must be 
abandoned. 
In order to be certain that parties satisfy these requirements, they must 
demonstrate that they are in compliance prior to the agreement going into effect. This 
is especially critical in view of the long, frustrating dispute resolution path contained 
in the Peru template. Of course this presumes that TTIP will have an effective dispute 
resolution provision that covers labor violations. Failure to adopt such a provision 
would be a fatal flaw to the effectiveness of any labor chapter. 
Vague limitations on the nature of violations that are covered by TTIP must also 
be avoided. Specifically, the Peru FTA requirements that labor violations must be “in a 
manner affecting trade or investment” and constitute a “sustained or reoccurring 
action or inaction” should be rejecting by TTIP negotiators. As mentioned, the mere 
fact that labor standards are included in a trade agreement should indicate a direct 
relationship to trade without placing a further burden of proof on an agreed party. 
Furthermore, also as mentioned, particularly outrageous violations of labor rights 
should by themselves be eligible for a complaint, regardless of whether the violation 
was part of a sustained or reoccurring violation. 
Fundamental human rights like the labor standards defined by the ILO 
Conventions apply to all workers throughout the world with equal intensity.  For this 
reason, side agreements or alternative arrangements like those used in conjunction 
with NAFTA or the U.S.-Colombia Labor Action Plan are no substitute for the kind 
of strong labor chapter described above. As previously mentioned, these side 
arrangements have not been effective. After more than 20 years the NAALC has not 
stopped Mexico from continually violating workers’ rights and the Labor Action Plan 
with Colombia has not stopped the murder and death threats for trade unionists and 
human rights activists. 
 
2. CONCLUSION  
TTIP represents an opportunity for the U.S. and EU to demonstrate to the world 
that a real and meaningful labor rights and standards can be part of any trade 
agreement. It is up to negotiators to seriously undertake efforts to accomplish this task. 
If they are successful, then at least one part of the TTIP will represent a step forward.37 
                                                     
37  Of course, TTIP would require significant improvements in many other chapters, 
including the elimination of the investor to state dispute provision, improvements to 
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If they are not successful, then they will fail to bring us one step closer to the kind of 
agreement that can make a difference in the lives of working men and women in the 
U.S., the EU and throughout the world. 
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government procurement, adoption of an effective and timely dispute resolution process for 
violations of the labor chapter as well as much work on transparency, consumer rights and 
the environment—to name a few. 
